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RESUMO: O caso da reforma de modernização portuária no Brazil incorpora os 
problemas que os reformadores brasileiros tem se defrontado nos últimos anos. Embora a 
reforma legislativa tenha sido aprovada em 1993 (Lei 8630/93), muitos obstáculos 
permanecem para a sua plena implementação. Este artigo analisa como as atitudes e 
ações empresariais retardam a reforma, e demonstra, em particular, como os empresários 
são incapazes de contribuir para implementação da reforma por causa dos obstáculos 
institucionais e problemas de ação coletiva. O paper sugere então possíveis abordagens 
para superar estas dificuldades; em especial, ele examina a evolução do corporativismo e 
a importância de desenvolver um novo cenário associativo, com a construção de “policy 
communities” comprometidas com as necessidades de cada setor, e também de uma 
ampla confederação capaz de representar os diferentes interesses inter-setoriais. O estudo 
utiliza uma combinação pouco comum de três abordagens teóricas que, 
surpreendentemente, complementam uma a outra: economia institucional (Douglas 
North); a lógica de ação coletiva (Mancur Olson); e a “policy network analysis” (Marsh 
& Rhodes, Jordan e Richardson).   
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ABSTRACT:  The case of port modernization reform in Brazil encapsules the problems 
Brazilian reformers face.  Although reform legislation was passed in 1993 (Law 
8630/93), many obstacles remain for full implementation of its provision.  This article 
focuses on how business attitudes and actions deferred reform, and demonstrates how 
business is unable to contribute to reform implementation because of institutional 
obstacles and collective action problems.  It then suggests possible approaches to 
overcoming these difficulties; specifically, it examines the evolution of corporatism and 
the value of developing a new associational landscape, with the construction of both 
close-knit policy communities meeting the needs of each sector and a broader peak 
association representing cross-sectoral business interests.  The study applies an unusual 
combination of three theoretical approaches that surprisingly complement each other: 
institutional economics (Douglas North), the logic of collective action (Mancur Olson), 
and policy network analysis (Marsh & Rhodes, Jordan and Richardson).   
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
  This article analyses the case of port modernization reform in Brazil and explains 
business’ exceptional role in formulating policy, but subsequent weak performance in 
contributing to and monitoring reform implementation.  The case is particularly 
interesting because it encapsules the problems Brazilian reformers face elsewhere in the 
liberalization process and throws light on the incrementalist approach to reform, typical 
in Brazil.  It also demonstrates how corporatist institutions hamper business articulation, 
interest representation and profits.  
 
This article focuses on how business attitudes and actions deferred reform, but it 
is based on a wider and extensive study of the formulation, adoption and implementation 
of the Port Modernization Law (Law 8630/93).  It shows how business is unable to 
ensure reform implementation because of institutional obstacles and collective action 
problems, and then suggests possible approaches to overcoming these difficulties.  It 
explores the options open to Brazil with respect to adapting corporatist institutions to a 
democratic and increasingly open market economy.  Specifically, it examines the 
evolution of corporatism and the value of developing a new associational landscape, with 
the construction of both close-knit policy communities meeting the needs of each sector 
and a broader peak association representing cross-sectoral business interests.  
Institutional constraints suggest a progressive pluralization of corporatism, with 
increasing democratization of societal input into policy-making, rather than a complete 
abandonment of the corporatist institutional structure.
1 There appears to be positive 
potential for the gradual evolution of corporatism.  Conversely, success would be less 
likely should policy-makers decide to introduce systemic change via a comprehensive 
overhaul of economic regimes and rules of the game.    
 
  The theoretical and empirical analysis appears side-by-side throughout the article, 
which applies an unusual combination of three theoretical approaches that surprisingly 
complement each other: institutional economics as developed by Douglas North, the logic 
of collective action as elaborated by Mancur Olson, and policy network analysis as 
developed by Marsh and Rhodes, Jordan and Richardson.
2  This combination enriches the 
analysis and is justified, given that any single approach cannot adequately explain the 
outcomes of the Brazilian political economy.  Thus, for example, institutional analysis 
focuses on the impact of institutions on policy design and outcomes, the Olsonion model 
focuses on the rationale behind the organization of groups, how this determines their 
power and impact on the policy process, and the policy network approach emphasizes the 
importance of on-going close links between business and State actors to maximize the 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of the study, corporatism refers to the formal structure of interest representation 
instituted by Vargas in the 1930s and 1940s.  The specific features of the corporatist structure include 
singular, compulsory, hierarchical and functionally differentiated categories organised into representative 
associations granted exclusive control over group resources and a representational monopoly vis a  vis their 
interaction with the State (Schmitter, 1971).   See Schmitter (1971 &1974),  Diniz and Boschi (1978), Diniz 
(1993),  Boschi (1991),Cardoso (1986), Cawson (1986), Cohen (1989), Evans (1979 & 1995),  O’Donnell 
(1977), and Tavares de Almeida (1989)  for good descriptions and analysis of corporatism in general and in 
Brazil. 
2 See bibliography for full references of these authors’ works.   
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match between policy intentions and outcomes.  However, North erroneously attributes 
goals to institutions instead of to societal actors and organizations and also fails to 
elaborate how institutions (such as corporatism) might actually increase transaction costs, 
Olson erroneously underplays the impact of the State in organizing collective action and 
of institutions on policy outcomes, and policy network analysis fails to consider the 
difficulty of forming and maintaining a policy community in times of policy change.  
 
In terms of methodology, the research project was based on written questionnaires 
and over seventy open-ended interviews (lasting between one and three hours) with most 
of the major participants in the process, including business and labor leaders, policy-
makers in the legislature and executive, port administrators, a labor court judge, and 
senior journalists (the media played a key role).  
 
The article has five sections: (i) introduction to the analytical framework; (ii) brief 
comments on the situation in Brazilian ports and the impact of business lobbying; (iii) 
how corporatist sectoralization and business disunity obstruct reform implementation; 
(iv) suggestions for overcoming business difficulties, specifically, policy networks to 
build sectoral strength and a business peak association to enhance national influence; and 
(v) some concluding remarks.    
 
II.  BUSINESS AS SPUR TO PORT REFORM LEGISLATION 
 
  Although a number of factors influenced the formulation and approval of the Port 
Modernization Law, Law 8630/93 in February 1993, the contribution of business 
lobbying stands out as the central factor, indispensable to the successful formulation of 
the policy.  Ação Empresarial Integrada (AEI), as the business lobby was known, was 
unique in Brazilian history, because it was the first time business formally organized a 
unified lobbying network to achieve a policy change via democratic means.  AEI’s 
success may lie in its unusual structure – a peak association that operated like a network.  
At its height, it included 52 business associations and federations
3, with the key members 
coming from the major exporting industries (mainly steel) and large private terminal 
owners.  Entrepreneurs eager to exploit the market’s demand for importing capital and 
consumer goods also gave AEI low-key support.  Moreover, it was willing to test new 
approaches to lobbying.  AEI convinced policy-makers in the executive and legislature of 
the importance of port reform and successfully presented its case to the media and the 
public.  Most remarkably, it managed to convince labor peak associations that reform was 
necessary and therefore to withhold their support from port unions.   
 
Table I - Sectoral Origin of AEI Members (May 1992) 
Confederations and Federations  
(industry & commerce)  
  10 
Mining, Steel & Other Metals      9 
Machines, Equipment & Transport Materials      6 
Chemicals, Textiles, Paper & Others      9 
                                                 
3 Although the federations did not actively participate in lobbying Congress, they lent their support to AEI 
and allowed it to speak in the name of most business.  This allowed AEI to rely on the moral support of the 
official corporatist associations, augmenting its legitimacy in the eyes of legislators and society.    
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Food & Agriculture      9 
Shipping & Port-Related      5 
Exports      2 
Source: AEI, 1992 
 
  By 1990, inefficient infrastructure, inadequate institutions and neglected 
investment needs lay at the heart of the high cost and low productivity of Brazilian ports.  
AEI’s inner core of six or seven businessmen undertook all negotiations and lobbying on 
behalf of business.  They avoided blaming the government directly for the situation in 
ports and focused on three principles:  
 
1.  End of the labour union monopoly;  
2.  Liberty of the private terminals to handle third party cargoes; and  
3.  Privatisation of port services and restructuring of ports in the near-term.   
 
A key AEI member provided useful insight when he acknowledged that: 
 "Businessmen at best had a general idea of the inefficiencies of the Brazilian port 
system.  They also knew that change would be beneficial, but were unsure about 
what exactly would serve their best interest.  This is the big secret of our unity.  
We appeared monolithic; we acted unified because the majority of businessmen 
did not understand the system.  They left port reform in our hands to do as we 
thought best."   
 
  Business consensus was most remarkable given the typical businessman’s attitude 
which is self-regarding, short-term and competitive vis-à-vis other businessmen. Business 
interviewees repeatedly stated that business refused to give up in the face of unmotivated 
governments, lethargic bureaucracies and insular labour unions.  However, as one 
business interviewee commented, “maintaining solidarity is very difficult, when business 
commitment dissolves with the first threat of a strike.”   
 
Table II - Degree of Lobbying Success of Business and Labor Groups 
    
Option  Business (port users)  Labor (port unions) 
Very Successful  18%  4% 
Successful 62%  29% 
Little Success  20%  58% 
Unsuccessful 0  9% 
Source: 45 questionnaire responses 
 
  Interviews revealed numerous positive evaluations of business unity and lobbying 
performance.  Port union leaders unanimously praised AEI’s organisational effort.  Here 
is one example: 
4 
 
“It is the most competent lobby ever seen in the country.  Business made excellent 
use of the media, maintained a constant presence in Congress, employed competent 
staff and pursued a rigorous follow-up on all points.”   
                                                 




Finally, in the context of democratization and liberalization, AEI demonstrated that 
business understood the need for a re-evaluation of past business strategies and a new 
approach to business-State relations.   
 
  In addition to strong and effective business lobbying, another four key factors acted 
as spurs to reform: (i) the effect of globalization, trade liberalization and systemic 
competitiveness (Custo Brasil) on the Brazilian economy; (ii) the impact of the disastrous 
situation in Brazilian ports on the efficiency of cargo handling; (iii) the experience of 
other country’s with port reform, especially port labor regime reform; and (iv) strong 
media interest which increased public awareness of the inefficiency of Brazilian ports.   
 
 
Table III - Loading of Non-Plane Steel Products  (1989) 
Port Average  Cost 
(US$/Ton) 
Size of Work Team  
(land + ship) 
Antwerp  4.50  24 + 18  =  42 
Hamburg  5.90  21 + 15  =  36 
Rotterdam  7.20  18 + 12  =  30 
New Orleans  10.00  24 + 15  =  39 
   
Vitoria  12 – 15   
Rio de Janeiro  18 – 23  28 + 45  = 73 
Santos  35 – 37   
Source: ASP, 1989 
 
Table IV - Average of Tons Loaded 
 Per Man/Hour  (1990) 
Kobe 184 
New Orleans  120 
Rotterdam 70 
Hamburg 60 
Santos and Rio  30 
    Source:  Jornal  do  Brasil,  1991 
 
 
Table V - Containers Loaded  










  Most businessmen admitted that before the liberalization of the economy, end of 
numerous subsidies, downturn in the domestic market and noticeable impact of 
globalization, businesses paid little attention to high port costs.  Moreover, ports were 
plagued by crumbling equipment and infrastructure, out-dated technology, the 
government’s arbitrary and precarious system of taxation, entangled port bureaucracy, 
inefficient customs procedures, as well as an unproductive labor regime.  
 
  However, it is only after 1990 that port costs and inefficiencies noticeably damaged 
the competitiveness of general cargo (i.e. non-bulk goods), or the very area of exports 
that dealt with manufactured goods with a higher value added component.  Although 
general cargo represents only a quarter of Brazilian exports, they stem from crucial 
sectors that affect the competitiveness and development of the economy.    Although the 
problems were recognized, business interviewees noted the risks of investing in ports 
under the prevailing institutional structure, because of uncertainly about the 
government’s commitment to improving basic infrastructure and streamlining 
bureaucratic procedures and business’ inability to independently determine its labor 
requirements.   
 
III.  BUSINESS AS OBSTACLE TO PORT REFORM IMPLEMENTATION   
 
  Ironically, business was not only the champion of port reform, but also one of the 
main agents to create obstacles in the path of reform implementation.  Its share of the 
blame goes beyond the ill-advised action of AEI leaders to disband immediately after 
port reform received presidential approval.  Business presented port workers with an 
opportunity to reclaim lost ground.  Workers gambled on uninformed port-users, the 
ambivalent position of ship owners and the satisfaction of private terminal owners.  
Union leaders correctly surmised that port-users would not monitor progress made on 
implementation; that ship owners would avoid confrontation on board their ships; that 
private terminal owners’ would lose the motivation to fight for the full implementation of 
all aspects of the new law.
5  
 
Corporatist Sectoralization:  The research project on which this paper is based found 
that the institutions of corporatism are so pervasive that they color the calculations and 
behavior of all economic agents.  The benefits of adhering to corporatist expectations are 
assimilated at all levels, and they provide the context within which policies are designed 
and then implemented.  Corporatism is the major underlying cause for the slow 
implementation of port reform.  Corporatist institutions award privileges and foster 
opposition to reform in port labor; create sources of power among bureaucrats and 
engender obstruction to reforms when these powers are withdrawn; and fragment 
business interests and generate apathy to the consequences of reform among 
businesspeople.   
 
                                                 
5 The law authorised private terminals to handle third party cargoes, thus granting the main demand of their 
association, ABTP.     
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The government is aware that port reform will stagnate unless corporatist 
privileges are withdrawn, but it is reluctant to address the general issue of institutional 
reform and unwilling to cut into the powers granted via the Consolidation of Labor Laws 
(CLT), the heart of corporatist legislation.
6  Although corporatism influenced the 
behavior of all actors in the port sector, this paper focuses on how corporatism shaped 
business attitudes and inhibited business action.  Corporatism brings workers and 
bureaucrats closer to their respective groups, but engenders disunity and apathy in a 
fragmented business class.
7  Thus, whereas labor and bureaucratic opposition to port 
reform required active obstruction, in the case of business, passive neglect ensured that 
corporatist institutions successfully blocked reform.  Business acknowledges that apathy 
is the result of years of  
 
!  economic uncertainty and survival concerns;  
!  reliance on State subsidies and incentives, creating a culture of dependence and 
paternalistic interaction with State institutions; and  
!  inadequate consultation of the membership base and the politicized management 
of the corporatist associations.   
 
Corporatism was popular among industrialists, because it maintained established 
patterns in capital-labor relations, granted access to substantial resources via the “Sistema 
S” (apprentice and training programs), and provided a guarantee against radical changes.  
Corporatist institutions provided some extra reassurance in a country beset with social, 
political and economic problems.  Moreover, business did not rely on corporatist 
associations alone, precisely because it was aware of the weaknesses inherent in 
corporatist groups and methods of interest representation.  The private sector often 
benefits from a parallel representative structure, which operates outside the confines of 
corporatist legislation.  However, Schmitter found that members attitudes, even in 
voluntary associations, are reminiscent of habits learnt in the corporatist arena: thus, they 
see private associations more as “conduits for favors from above, than as channels for 
expressing their own demands.” (Schmitter, 1971)    
 
  Corporatism failed to create strong business class solidarity and disallowed the 
formation of a single peak association.  The State ensured that businesspeople, locked 
into monopolistic structures, were given few opportunities to organize and co-ordinate 
their activities.  Businesspeople learned to live with and benefit from State intervention, 
and to focus their actions on requests made in their individual capacity.  Business 
interviewees did not remark on the contradiction inherent in the federal government's 
withdrawal from port operations, but right to nominate the head of the new port authority.  
                                                 
6 Curiously, the daily-hire port union monopoly is based on privileges awarded under the CLT, although 
port workers formally fall outside theCLT (this is because the CLT does not apply to avulsos/daily-hire 
workers).    
7 Perhaps the worst consequence of embedded corporatism is the evident apathy it generates.  Thus, for 
example, when the capital moved, the CNI did not find it necessary to move its headquarters to Brasilia.  
This only occurred in late 1996, when the new president of the confederation, Fernando Bezerra (who is a 
senator, and therefore, spends most of his time in Brasilia), insisted that industrialists cannot hope to 
monitor developments in the capital and influence policy without a permanent presence in Brasilia.  
 
8 
Instead, they use the Port Authority Councils (CAPs) as a forum for the discussion of 
capital-labor issues, with the government as mediator in the corporatist tradition.   
 
Several businessmen commonly referred to their associations and federations as  
"parasites" and "dinosaurs", that they  “represent diluted interests and operate like grand 
money spending machines, and serve to inflate the egos and pockets of their directors."
8  
One claimed, "Doctrine and philosophy are not as important as the struggle for power 
within the FIESP.  Unimportant businessmen often strive for the most important positions 
within the federation."  One Sao Paulo businessman noted that in the Northeast, 
directorships in federations were often used as points of access to federal and state 
government officials to arrange personal benefits, such as debt pardon.     
 
  Policy implementation highlighted corporatism’s truly debilitating affect on 
business action and unity.  Here are two illustrations of the problem: the Commercial 
Association of Sao Paulo (ACSP) port-user committee, COMUS, conducted a survey in 
May 1994.  It sent out 1000 survey forms to small and medium-sized export businesses 
and received only 81 responses.  95% of these firms said that they did not follow progress 
in the implementation of Law 8630/93.  A less obvious case is the low level of protests 
from port-users affected by the cartel-like practices of the private sector warehousing 
firms in the Santos area.  Warehousing firms argued their case based on the legal 
requirement that they charge clients at least as much as the state-owned dock company, 
CODESP (this type of regulation invalidates port-users’ protests).  A similar situation 
developed with respect to the tariffs charged by the newly qualified private sector port 
operators.  Business seldom bothers to make collective protests against uncompetitive 
business or regulatory practices.   
 
  However, business attitudes appear to be changing.  The younger generation of 
businesspeople, such as Ricardo Semler, often refers to FIESP as an "irrelevant, 
anachronistic and comatose" institution.  In June 1996, he wrote: 
 
"FIESP has no reason to exist any longer.  Not in its classical format.  … 
All organizations of this type (i.e. agglomerating business interests) are 
bureaucratized to the point of inactivity; they are cellars facilitating 
influence bargaining and corruption, and end up attracting petty interests 
and figures of little importance." 
9 
 
The institutions of Brazilian corporatism are decaying and fragile, but there is still 
an unwillingness to overhaul a system believed to offer business more positive rewards 
than negative sanctions.     
 
                                                 
8 These comments are from a number of business interviewees in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Porto 
Alegre.  I am not including any personal details about the interviewees, because of the sensitive nature of 
these comments. 
9 Signed article by Ricardo Semler in Folha de São Paulo, 21 June 1996.  Semler is a past director of FIESP 
and a vocal critic of business corporatism.    
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Disintegrating Consensus:  Decades of past governments' divisive strategies made 
business consensus rare and unlikely to last.  This gave port workers the opportunity to 
encourage the differences that were bound to arise among businesses.  Tavares de 
Oliveira noted the competitive behavior of businesses that ignored collective decisions 
and made private agreements with unions to speed up the handling of their own 
cargoes.
10 This type of free-rider behavior discredited any attempt to demonstrate 
business unity and solidarity on the port issue.   
 
Business consensus suffers, because of the short-term approach of most 
businesspeople.  Most suffered from the policy shifts and shocks of the past two decades, 
reducing their capacity to resist, based on principle.  As one AEI leader noted, 
"Everybody is courageous when all is well … The first sign of trouble and all resistance 
breaks down.  This makes maintaining solidarity an unrealizable goal." (interview in 
October 1997 in Rio de Janeiro).  Conflicts of interest among directors and conflicting 
interests of members are the norm.  Matters are further complicated by the fact that 
federations in different states sometimes oppose each other's positions.
11  Not 
surprisingly, government and legislators usually receive a confused picture of business 
policy preferences.  Brazilian business’ Achilles heel is disunity.  
 
  Ultimately, AEI failed because business was disunited.  Cooperation and 
consensus were practical as well as theoretical problems.  A superficial consensus, once 
exposed, strengthened the hands of the opposition.  It was superficial to the extent that it 
was a passive agreement to go along with AEI leaders' demands.
12  What had been a 
strength during policy formulation (because it limited the number of participants in the 
policy arena and concentrated policy inputs), became a weakness in the policy 
implementation phase of reform (because most businessmen were not committed to AEI 
positions, and hence, uninterested in monitoring implementation).  Cargo volumes and 
values were not sufficiently large to make it worthwhile to hold out for reform, and 
businesses preferred to yield to the demands of port unions and port operators to ensure 
timely delivery of their goods.   
 
The fragile consensus broke down as soon as the diverse sub-sectors realized the 
differing impact of port reform on each of their businesses.  Thus, while port-users 
continued to struggle with high prices and inefficiency, port operators suddenly resisted 
reducing prices and investing in modernization.  Both operators and ship owners were 
accused of cartel-like price setting.
13  Finally, some business sectors, that had initially 
passively supported AEI’s demands for port reform, woke up to the fact that more 
efficient ports also increase the competitiveness of imports, possibly with a negative 
impact on their own profits.   
                                                 
10 See O Globo, 9 November 1995 and 3 October 1996. 
11 For example, FIESP opposed a bill providing special incentives for the merchant marine and ship-
builders.  In Rio de Janeiro, there was strong support for the bill reflecting the importance of ship-builders 
in the Rio federation. Interviews in Sao Pauloin July 1994.   
12 One labour leader remarked on the “fictional and fabulous” nature of the business consensus, which 
“once unmasked could not protect business victories.”  (interview in October 1997 in Brasilia).  
13 A 1996 FIPE study found that the private sector was to blame for a large proportion of port inefficiency 




  One important lesson for business was that the fighting spirit must be maintained 
until implementation is assured and complete.  Businesspeople soon realized that reviving 
their former unity of purpose and action was a formidable task, and the reconstituted AEI, 
operating under the name Comissão Portos, was unable to achieve the same level of 
commitment and unity among its members.  All the same, AEI set a powerful example.  
In fact, business tried to build an AEI-style unified multi-associational platform around 
demands for constitutional reform.  Jorge Gerdau was specifically invited to lead this 
effort, in an attempt to capitalize on his reputation as leader of AEI.   
 
  Business also learnt that consensus and unity were invaluable assets in a lobbying 
campaign.  In 1996, Fernando Bezerra, President of CNI, called upon industry to present 
a united front to government and society:  
 
"We feel the necessity of constructing unity in the industrial sector, which 
is not an easy task.  Not that we are disunited, but the fact is that we are 
dispersed.  Also the client-supplier relation can be conflictual. Hence, the 
need to create unity.  The time has come when industry must show its face 
to Brazilian society, to express what we think, to state what we want and 
to present a strong profile.  …  We have a contribution to make that goes 
beyond our factories; we have a contribution to make to the economic, 
political and social development of our country."
14                     
 
To summarize, in certain cases, business provided workers and bureaucrats with 
the ammunition to destroy hopes for an efficient and cost-effective port system. Although 
corporatism and disunity reinforce each other, there are signs of change. Firstly, 
globalization, liberalization and deregulation pose new challenges for business and 
promote more active participation in the policy debate.  
 
Secondly, democratization altered the parameters of acceptable business lobbying 
and interaction with State actors.  The means employed to influence outcomes became as 
important as the composition of business demands.  Currently, lobbying as well as policy 
outputs are evaluated in terms of their normative content, and demands must be couched 
in terms of the public interest to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of society.  Moreover, the 
State no longer possesses the authoritarian capacity to enforce implementation, and must 
negotiate with interest groups so that policy intentions match policy outcomes.   
 
  Thirdly, whereas in the past, government ministers "bought the conscience" of 
federation directors by handing out subsidies and privileges, the new environment forces 
the federations and businesses to look within themselves for profit and success.  Many 
businesses have committed substantial resources to modernizing and improving the 
quality of their output and the productivity of their factories. The new business elite is 
drawn from firms that are winners in a competitive environment, and are unlikely to 
allow reactionary corporatist practices to jeopardize the success of their investments.  
                                                 
14 Quoted in the Estado de São Paulo, 19 May 1996.  
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AEI's achievements give business hope that corporatism and disunity can be overcome, 
and that institutions and behavior respond to changing circumstances.     
 
IV.  OVERCOMING BUSINESS DIFFICULTIES 
 
  Analysis of business difficulties in influencing and sustaining the pressure for 
policy reform raises the issue of whether the rigid structures of corporatism are 
compatible with liberalization and modernization.  Does corporatism inhibit progress?   
The port reform case indicates that it does, while the early period of AEI success suggests 
solutions that move in opposite directions.  On the one hand, at the sectoral level, 
business needs to overcome fragmentation and weak policy formulation and 
implementation capacity by constructing close-knit and closed policy communities. On 
the other hand, at the aggregate (class) level, it must overcome disunity and problems of 
collective action by building a broad peak association structure that can aggregate and 
articulate business interests at the national level.  The following analysis demonstrates 
that these solutions are complementary in character, although they might appear to be 
contradictory.    
 
Policy Networks and Sectoral Strength:  Instituions place formal and informal 
constraints on economic and political actors, and these may or may not be supportive of 
reform.  They might focus on redistributive activities, instead of promoting productivity 
enhancing activities.  They might increase the costs of doing business, instead of 
reducing costs (an excellent example is the so-called labor union monopoly in Brazilian 
ports).  This paper demonstrates how corporatist institutions influence the representation 
of interests and how the institutional structure of ports affects economic performance.  
Institutions provide stability, but must include mechanisms to allow society to explore 
alternatives to solving new problems and to respond to new issues.  "It is essential to have 
rules that eliminate not only failed economic organizations, but failed political 
organizations as well … that the institutional structure not only rewards successes, but 
also vetoes the survival of maladapted parts of the organizational structure, …"
15  
 
Transaction costs (as featured in North's analysis) are a static concept, whereas 
evidence suggests that institutions may present a more dynamic element.  Thus, 
institutions can steer the process of change, enlisting cooperation among economic and 
political actors, and circumventing obstacles in the smoothest way possible.  This study 
considers the need for institutions that allow the implementation of a more radical and 
fast-paced reform process.  The research project found it useful to look into the option 
that policy network analysis offers to adapt corporatist institutions to a modernizing 
reform agenda.   
 
Policy network analysis, one of the recent developments in the study of interest 
group intermediation, emphasizes the continuity of relations between interest groups and 
government departments, in an essentially pluralist context.  It focuses on the meso-level 
of policy-making, usually looking into the relationship that develops between political 
institutions and interest groups.  Jordan and Richardson developed the idea of the policy 
                                                 
15 North (1990), p 81,  Italics are my words.   
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community as a closed and close group with frequent interaction and shared values, 
where State actors tend to consult certain groups, and limit access to others.  The 
relationship was not zero-sum, since a well-resourced State can increase its autonomy, 
and extend its infrastructural power, through policy networks.  In the longer run, the 
Tienanmen Square option is not a feasible one (Smith, 1993).  The network approach 
emphasized the difficulty in drawing a stark dichotomy between State and civil society.  
After all, State actors are members of society.  
 
Networks can range from a limited exchange of information to institutionalization 
of the group within the policy process; from open issue networks to closed and close-knit 
policy communities.  Marsh and Rhodes note that networks can be arranged on a 
continuum, ranging from policy community to issue network (see Table VI).  In a policy 
community there is a high degree of consensus on policy aims, rules of the game, as well 
as the range of problems and potential solutions to them.  Policy communities create 
stability in the policy arena, since they de-politicize the issue.  In an issue network the 
reverse applies – there is no consensus between groups on policy aims, a large number of 
groups and government departments may be involved, increasingly politicizing the issue 
and impeding stable and lasting solutions.    
 
 
Table VI – Policy Network Analysis 
Dimension  Policy Community  Issue network 
Membership  Limited numbers; some exclusion  Large numbers 
Type of Interest  Economic/Professional  Wide range of interests 
Frequency of 
Interaction 
Frequent; high quality  Contact fluctuates 
Continuity  Membership, values, and outcomes 
are persistent 
Fluctuating access 
Consensus  Participants share basic values  Some agreement; some 
conflict 
Power  Positive-sum; balance  Zero-sum; unequal  
      Source: Smith (1993); Marsh & Rhodes (1992) 
 
  Although there are a few exceptions, notably Peter Evans
16, the general body of 
network literature does not deal with developing economies.  Yet here the importance of 
networks, personal and institutional, cannot be overlooked.  Brazil is a case in point.  In a 
country where economic groups are marginalized from strategic decision-making, 
businesspeople are forced to develop alternate, informal channels of access to State 
actors, usually to the relevant bureaucratic agency, entrusted with the application of rules 
and the allocation of resources, in the sector.  Thus, business associations develop into 
sector-specific nuclei with solidarity to particular agencies.  All the same, policy network 
analysis represents a new approach to business-State relations in Brazil, notwithstanding 
hints in the literature referring to iron triangles and bureaucratic rings.    
                                                 
16 Evans (1995) developed the concept of “embedded autonomy” to explain the network of social ties that 
binds the State to society and provides the institutional channels for policy formulation in developing 




Already, Schmitter noted the paradox of the highly formal nature of corporate 
interest groups that contrasted with the intimate, interpersonal and largely unrecorded 
manner of conducting business-State relations. For most of the past 60 years, business 
normally dealt with the government via narrow, decentralized, ad hoc networks, or what 
Cardoso called "bureaucratic rings".  When in the early 1980s, Minister Delfim Netto 
phased out official representation of business in government councils, businesspeople 
were forced to turn to the middle-level bureaucracy, and to create informal links with 
them to influence policy implementation.  Thus, bureaucratic spheres emerged, drawing 
in bureaucratic allies of business to defend the latter's economic interests (Cardoso, 
1986).  This maintained the importance of informal networks, and the particularistic and 
individualistic style of Brazilian business-State relations.  However, as Schneider notes, 
industrialists only had limited success at perforating bureaucratic insulation, and in 
general, "industrialists have never modeled lasting paths of access to policy-making 
circles." (Schneider, 1991).  
 
  Bureaucratic rings should not be seen as the equivalent of policy communities.  
They differ on a number of important aspects.  First, bureaucratic rings were targeted at 
the regulatory and implementation phase of policy; a policy community's objective is to 
influence policy-formulation and monitor implementation.  Second, business approached 
State actors in bureaucratic rings as a supplicant, in the expectation of some reward; in a 
policy community, the State consults business at every stage, and business is an almost 
equal partner in determining the policy agenda and policy output.  Third, bureaucratic 
rings were ad hoc groups, based on personal relations and interaction; a policy 
community is long lasting with frequent interaction based on semi-institutionalized 
relations (i.e. a policy community does not rely on exclusively personal connections and 
preferences, and exists beyond the terms of office of individual ministers, bureaucrats and 
group leaders).  Fourth, bureaucratic rings were often secretive and did not seek exposure 
in the media, making them most successful in a non-democratic setting; a policy 
community operates in a democratic context and relies on the media to communicate its 
views to society.  
 
 
Table VII – Types of Policy Networks in Brazil 
Dimension  Policy Community  Bureaucratic Ring 
State Actor 
Participation 
High-level bureaucrats; Ministers  Middle- bureaucrats; rarely 
ministers  
Target Policy  formulation  & 
implementation 
Policy regulation & 
implementation 
Interaction  Frequent; semi-institutionalized  Ad hoc; personal  
Continuity  Membership, values, outcomes 
persistent 
Fluctuating access and 
outcomes 
Consensus  Participants share basic values  Not directly relevant 
Power  Positive-sum; balance  Positive-sum; unequal  
Media  Free and democratic  Controlled and censored 




The key concern in a democratic setting is the State’s need to retain autonomy and 
prevent its agent’s closeness from degenerating into rent-seeking coalitions, that is, 
bureaucratic rings are seen as unacceptable forms of business-State interaction.  Evans 
found that industrial transformation thrived, where the State successfully combined an 
embedded bureaucracy with an autonomous State and where business-State networks 
helped improve policy inputs and outcomes.  One of the main benefits of  “embedded 
autonomy” was that it helped States resolve the contradiction between credibility and 
flexibility in a reform project.  It allowed bureaucrats to make adjustments to reform 
packages, without losing credibility.  The key was communication with business 
networks that learned to understand the signals and intentions of State actors.  Reformers 
need societal support.   
 
  The juggling act that demonstrated firmness of intentions and flexibility of actions 
required strong institutions and lines of communication between the key participants in 
the political economy.  In this sense, policy communities assist in achieving a close 
match between policy intentions and outcomes due to their ability to maintain open lines 
of communication between State and society.  In Brazil, repeated economic crises forced 
policy-makers to change direction on a number of occasions, but limited dialogue 
between business and State increased uncertainty and complicated implementation.  
Moreover, fragile institutions, at both the State and associational levels, made it difficult 
to organize support for reform programs.  The only strong institution, corporatism, 
hindered market-oriented reform, and hampered the formation of new networks geared 
towards structural reform.   
 
The strength of the "port union leaders-port administrators-Brasilia bureaucrats" 
network had never been challenged before AEI and Collor.  The institutionalized 
separation of capital and labor served the interests of the obstructive bureaucracy, who 
realized that structural reform reduced their power and increased the possibility of their 
unemployment.  The coincidence of port workers' and bureaucrats' interests, in one of the 
few corporatist networks to exclude business participation, reinforced opposition to 
reform.  The network's lasting power became evident during the struggle to implement 
Law 8630/93.  Union leaders, interviewed in 1994, could proudly claim that "so far we 
have lost nothing; nothing has changed."  There is no better testimony to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the corporate network in maintaining the status quo than the survival of 
the port union monopoly in nominating daily-hire labor to work teams aboard ships.   
 
Liberalization and globalization forced business to open its eyes to the long-
lasting hold of the port unions on port policy (the port labor regime dates back to the 
1930s), and exposed the weakness of business networks in the port sector.  
Democratization provided business with channels to attract the attention of the executive 
and legislature.  Business understood that the politicization of the port issue was 
necessary to force a complete change in the structure and institutions of the port sector, to 
overthrow the established rules of the game and consultation mechanisms.  It needed to 
muscle its way into the comfortable relations within the corporatist network between 
bureaucrats and labor in the sector.  The competence and perseverance of the AEI lobby  
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bore fruit in terms of business impact on policy output. But the lack of a stable policy 
community jeopardized business influence over a match between policy intentions and 
outcomes.   
 
AEI's relations to State actors resembled an issue network in terms of frequency 
of interaction, continuity and consensus.  In terms of the other dimensions in Table II, i.e. 
membership, type of interest and power, it resembled a policy community.  At the policy 
formulation stage, AEI could have been described as a fledgling policy community.  
However, business leaders initially failed to recognize the importance of establishing a 
long-term close-knit policy community to monitor reform implementation, reducing AEI 
at best to an issue network, suffering from the associated weaknesses of such networks.   
 
Although corporatist networks and policy communities are based on very 
different principles, their essential structure of stable relations between State and non-
State actors are sufficiently similar to allow incremental adjustments to corporatist 
institutions, democratizing them, to eventually establish policy communities.  The 
research project found that corporatist networks could serve as the building blocks for the 
development of democratic policy networks via the restructuring and consolidation of the 
former into policy communities.  The latter provide groups with new opportunities to 
form constructive democratic alliances that collaborate with reform efforts and offer a 
feasible option for the evolution of corporatism.     
 
  However, policy communities do have their limitations.  Firstly, the legacy of 
corporatism in Brazil: replacing corporatist institutional arrangements with their 
emphasis on the top-down approach to interest representation with policy communities 
with their emphasis on a shared role for all participants in decision-making is unlikely to 
be seamless.  Secondly, impatient reformers might not be willing to wait for the gradual 
development of policy communities. Moreover, policy communities in general can have 
the distinct disadvantage of discouraging innovative approaches and radical solutions to 
policy problems, because of their emphasis on institutionalized non-conflictual relations 
within the community.  
 
It may not be possible to create efficient policy communities in the short run, but 
these networks present a better medium-term opportunity for business to influence policy 
outcomes than do purely pluralist options.  There is a certain appeal to the logic of 
adaptive efficiency, where the institutional structure changes via incremental adjustments 
to the formal rules and the informal constraints and norms of behavior, avoiding abrupt 
breaks in the historical evolution of these institutions.   
 
Peak Associations and National Influence:  This section seeks to explain the origins 
and formation of AEI from a theoretical point of view, and to demonstrate a likely source 
of momentum for the evolution of corporatism.  The simple Olsonian argument is that the 
effectiveness of a group is not a function of its degree of support in society, but rather 
depends on its ability to organize itself to attain a collective good.  Moreover, "the 
business community as a whole is not well organized in the sense that particular 
industries are.  The business community as a whole is not a small privileged or  
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intermediate group – it is definitely a large, latent group.  As a result, it has the same 
problems of organization as the other segments of society." (Olson, 1965).      
 
The logic of collective action leads to the expectation that interests remain latent 
unless a so-called political entrepreneur succeeds in making co-operation rational and 
minimizes the problem of free-riders.  The entrepreneur overcomes the final obstacles to 
collective action, if he can gain official recognition for the group, guaranteeing access 
and contact to the State (this may be via acceptance into the relevant policy community). 
Olson's original version of the logic of collective action, mistakenly, does not pay much 
attention to the role of the State in organizing interests and the impact of institutions on 
the translation of policy preferences into policy outcomes.  It focused on the formation of 
groups, but not on their survival and influence over policy.   
  
In developing countries, bureaucratic control over distribution of subsidies gives 
industrialists every incentive to focus on individual interests and free ride rather than 
investing effort in developing a collective agenda.  In this context, it becomes necessary 
to develop institutions that minimize the conflict between social and individual interests.  
Government economic decision-makers must be insulated from personalistic and partisan 
pressures.  As Geddes (Geddes, 1986) points out, economic development involves a shift 
of resources between sectors, geographical areas and social groups as well as from 
consumption to investment.  This imposes costs and generates opposition.  When 
opposition originates in groups, where a secure and established network between officials 
and private interests exist, reform and economic transformation is delayed, if not aborted.  
Hence, in this view, the importance of giving a wide variety of interest groups the 
conditions to organize and represent their interests.   
 
  A crucial point in the logic of collective action model is that given the dynamics 
and difficulties of group organization, normally organizing small groups is much easier.  
Olson, noting the high degree of organization in the business community elsewhere, 
points out that the "by-product" theory need not always apply to small or privileged 
groups, because organizing collective action in small groups is usually based on "special 
interests".  Moreover, "widespread and enthusiastic agreement on a political goal may 
give rise to no contribution at all" (Moe, 1980), because nobody has a disproportionate 
gain from or a special interest in organizing for it.  Thus, in terms of impact on public 
policy, where large groups fail to organize, small groups manage to organize around their 
special interests.  This may severely distort the underlying social plurality of interests.  
The above scene repeatedly plays itself out in Brazil.  
 
  State corporatism and interventionism encouraged businesses to present their 
demands individually, by focusing on particularistic paths of influence to State actors, 
despite nominal membership of corporatist-monopolistic associations.  Moreover, 
Brazilian business had little experience in organizing cross-sectoral collective action, and 
when in the 1980s, it attempted to do so found that it backfired as a strategy to guarantee 
access to and influence over State actors.  The União Brasileira dos Empresarios, 




17 are examples of peak association type structures that aimed 
to create cross-sectoral consensus on industrial policy issues.   
 
All three associations failed to make an impact, because of the inconsistencies 
inherent in the variety of ideological and regional positions, and the divergent styles and 
mechanisms used to articulate business interests.
18  After 1990, the situation was 
exacerbated by the dissonance between fashionable neo-liberal ideology and traditional 
corporatist practice.  Even AEI's new approach to lobbying failed to lay down a lasting 
structure for an encompassing peak association to support necessary structural and 
institutional reforms.   
 
The Brazilian corporatist model made no provision for an encompassing peak 
association, and there were separate confederations for each business sector, such as 
commerce, industry, banking and agribusiness.  Theory argues that an effective peak 
association, including members from all sectors and regions, would force business to look 
beyond the individualistic and sectoral interests of firms.  Political scientists and 
economists suggest this as one of the best solutions for creating a cohesive, organized, 
informed and effective business class.
19 Instead, in Brazil, strong regional rivalries and 
corporatist fragmentation hamper a national consensus.
20    
 
The case of port reform is a superlative example where the logic of collective 
action model is relevant.  Port union leaders were efficient and effective political 
entrepreneurs.  The port union monopoly over employment on the docks and onboard 
ships guaranteed a loyal membership.  Port worker's inflexible interests and assets made 
cohesive strong associations/unions vital for their survival.
21  Moreover, the strong 
networks between State actors and port unions left the latter relatively secure in the 
knowledge that change would not be introduced easily.  It is also relevant to note that 
port unions did not belong to any of the labor peak associations, and this left them free to 
ignore the impact of inefficient ports and the port union monopoly on other workers. As 
Moe points out, "formal membership indicates that the group is successful at selling 
selective incentives not that it is politically popular." (Moe, 1980).   
 
                                                 
17 IEDI was not interested in mass dissemination, but focused on the elite of economic bureaucrats and 
industrialists.  However, economic crisis, protectionist sympathies of some members, discord over the 
influence of the PNBE, and the 1992 FIESP elections led to a weakening of the organisation.  When IEDI 
President Paulo Cunha refused Itamar Franco's offer of the Finance Ministry in 1993, many members left, 
disappointed with what they saw as a lack of commitment to furthering industrialist's interests.  IEDI, 
subsequently, lost much of its support, is seen as very protectionist, and is now marginal in the policy-
making landscape. 
18 See Diniz and Boschi, (1993)  and Schneider (1997) for an extensive discussion of this problem. 
19 Witness the success of Mexican, Chilean, Colombian and Korean business associations.   
20 The regional dimension traditionally pitted the large rich states (São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro 
and Rio Grande do Sul) against each other, and more recently pitted the rural poorer North against the 
richer industrialised South. 
21 Frieden (1991) argues that sectors using more specific and dedicated assets are more likely to overcome 
obstacles to collective action and lobby the government to minimise the costs of policy adjustments during 
periods of reform, even if these reforms are beneficial to the economy in general.  
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  Until recently, in line with Olsonian predictions of group behavior, port-users, a 
dispersed group with few strong motivations for collective action, remained a latent  
interest group.
22  Business assets were more flexible and seldom tied to one area of 
activity.  An effective port reform lobby was organized only after the impact of 
globalization, an end to ISI and the opening of the economy forced industry to focus on 
competitiveness.  Again in line with Olsonian predictions, the few large industrialists 
with a vital stake in reducing port costs, or expecting a disproportionate gain, took the 
initiative in organizing the port reform lobby (this included the steel exporters, like 
Gerdau, and private terminal owners).  The importance of a critical mass of individuals 
willing to bear the initial costs of organizing collective action was crucial.  This active 
group of winners could then overcome the apathy of the rest.  However, AEI failed to 
institutionalize its organizational structure, and hence, lost an opportunity to build a 
stable policy community or even a broader-based peak association.   
 
The port reform issue underlined the erosion of traditional business-State 
relations.  Democratization and socio-economic modernization changed the political and 
economic context within which business operated, and challenged the existing patterns of 
interest aggregation and representation.  First, democratization increased the importance 
of transparency in policy-making and implementation, and of augmenting the role of 
labor to prevent business capture of bureaucratic agencies.  Second, democratization 
changed the position of bureaucrats, as business networks or individual firms' ties within 
bureaucratic rings were diluted.  Third, labor became more assertive with socio-economic 
modernization.  It was quick to form a number of competing labor peak associations to 
bring their collective interests to bear on policy-makers and to enhance their bargaining 
power with employers.  Fourth, the heightened complexity of economic policy-making 
and the reduced capacity of the State enhanced the role of business associations in policy 
implementation.  Fifth, the younger generation of business leaders accepted the need for 
an open and democratic approach to policy-makers and other State actors.  It is in this 
modern business class that there originates the strong possibility of moving beyond rent-
seeking coalitions and individualistic forms of business-State interaction.   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
It is worth highlighting the significance and scope of the research project as well 
as the benefits from applying an eclectic mix of approaches and theories to explain 
business behavior.  Although the port reform process in Brazil is a very specific and 
narrow area of study, the case is rich with suggestions for institutional and structural 
reforms in other issue areas in Brazil.  It demonstrated the consequences of overlooking 
the influence and entrenched position of prevalent corporatist networks.  The wide-
ranging impact of port reform on the economy as a whole and the way it involved all 
participants in the political process provide useful insight into how interests can 
successfully approach the question of policy and institutional reform.   
 
                                                 
22 This argument is reinforced by the fact that capitalists in general find it very difficult to co-operate since 
their principal relationship to each other is governed by competition.      
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   To summarize, this article analyzed the impact of corporatism and the difficulty 
of institutional change; it then used policy network analysis to suggest the possible 
direction of institutional modernization.  The dynamic element in the evolutionary 
process was explained via the logic of collective action model, which involves evaluating 
the conditions required for business to organize and co-operate in its demands for 
institutional change.  AEI closely reflects the theoretical explanations for the evolution of 
Brazilian institutions and interest groups.  It constructed unity from corporatist 
fragmentation, after an active group of winners managed to organize collective action 
along the lines of policy networks.  
 
 Although AEI managed to put in place a successful issue network, it failed to 
establish a policy community to replace the old-style corporatist network in ports.  This 
failure touches on a very important question in the academic debate around institutional 
change: what accounts for the survival of institutions that consistently under-perform 
over long periods of time?  The paper provided some insight into the nature of vested 
interests, and how reformers find it extremely difficult to shift the former’s focus from 
redistributive to productive activities.  Another obstacle is State capacity, which this 
article does not elaborate on.   
 
  The slow and costly reform process, weighed down by the legacy of corporatist 
inertia as described in this article, is perhaps the least efficient approach to reform, but 
Brazil is yet to demonstrate political commitment and economic backing for a radical, 
clean-cut break away from past institutional structures and procedures.  The question of 
constructing a lasting consensus reappears at numerous junctures, but so far institutions 
and the political bargaining process have been unable to prevent the consensus from 
disintegrating.  While some attempts were made at establishing policy networks to steer 
the reform process, these have not only failed to entrench themselves, but also proved 
unable to rationalize policy reform and maximize the social and economic benefits of the 
reform process.   
 
  Brazil is often criticized for its incrementalist approach to reform, but these critics 
do not take a number of specific conditions into consideration.  Firstly, and most 
obviously, Brazil is a vast country with a sophisticated and complex institutional 
structure seldom encountered in other countries with a similar level of development.  The 
differing levels of development and capacity to implement policy directives complicate 
the situation.  Thus, the federal government might set out general policy prescriptions, 
but must rely on the capacity of local officials to interpret and implement these policies.  
Needless to say, this need to cater to the varying capabilities of State actors provides 
private groups with opportunities to bargain for a favorable interpretation of their 
interests.
23  Secondly, the State was further weakened, because the subjective models or 
ideologies of most actors hampered institutional change, and the poor information 
feedback made it difficult to measure the costs and benefits of reform (the latter is not an 
issue in the case of port reform).  Thirdly, Brazil underwent a unique controlled internal 
process of democratization as well as economic liberalization.  The gradual 
                                                 
23 Geddes and Nunes make similar arguments to explain the difference in State capacity and coexistence of 
efficient and modern with traditional, clientelistic bureaucrats.   
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democratization and relatively more abrupt liberalization
24 were adopted via internal 
decisions and not imposed by external pressures.  Fourthly, this domestic control over the 
crucial modernization processes gave State actors and interest groups enormous self-
confidence in their abilities to orchestrate change.   
 
The Brazilian political economy is still searching for innovative ways of 
expressing the newfound political freedom and controlling the damage inflicted by the 
new economic forces operating in the country.  The port reform process might be an 
extreme and stark example of business lobbying and the legacy of corporatism, but it 
served as an excellent means for laying bare the tendencies exhibited by and hindering 
the Brazilian reform process.  The main value of the analysis lies in the fact that port 
reform can be linked to the broader reform agenda in Brazil and Latin America.   
 
To conclude, the port reform process exposed all the weaknesses of Brazilian 
business, but also demonstrated that business could overcome these weaknesses.   The 
key lessons were that strength and influence were the fruits of unity and consensus 
among businesspeople, and corporatist institutions could evolve into policy networks 
based on pluralist and democratic approaches to business-State relations.  AEI showed 
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